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Analysis: 
Libya and the EU’s Strategic Security Interests 
Negotiations between Libya and the EU regarding an MP have not yet taken place. However, 
the political progress in Libya, following the fall of Muammar Qadhafi were followed closely by 
the EU, especially regarding the security situation, as noted in a ENP Regional Report of March 
2013: “with the worsening of the security situation, particularly in Libya, Sinai and the Sahel, 
reforming the security sector inherited from the previous regimes, while maintaining law and 
order, is becoming an important issue” (EU-Commission, 2013c: 2-3). The changing realities in 
the southern Mediterranean involve new challenges related to migration. From the EU side a 
new security environment must be based on dealing with the main challenges related to 
migration – one of which has to do with migrants from far away, Africa south of the Sahara. 
There is a commonality of interests here, but there are no guarantees that this commonality of 
interests will lead to sound cooperation between the “north” and the “south”. As mentioned 
by Derek Lutterbeck the post-Qadhafi regime has declared its resolve to address the migration 
issue (Lutterbeck, 2013: 162). But obviously the development in Libya in 2013-14 makes it 
more than difficult to manage an efficient control of the migratory movements in the 
enormous country. 
As mentioned by Sergio Carrera et al, dialogues between the EU and Libya concerning a 
Mobility Partnership have been foreseen, but have so far not taken place (Carrera et al., 2012: 
2). The EU launched a number of different programmes in order to support the development 
of a civil society in Libya in 2011-12, but the deteriorating security situation in the country in 
2012-14 have made it very difficult to continue the activities there (Seeberg, 2014a). For the 
EU security is a high priority in relation to Libya and the development of an EU Mobility 
Partnership agreement could evolve into a part of EU-Libyan cooperation. Obviously, the 
migration pressure towards Europe is less intense regarding the Libyan population as such. 
First of all the role of Libya will be a question of working together with the EU to reduce transit 
migration through Libya from the Sahel region and Africa south of the Sahara. The incentives 
for Libya are to obtain “external help to tackle its significant domestic security challenges, and 
to build state institutions from scratch” (Kausch, 2013: 38). There is a commonality of interest 
between the EU and Libya on transit migration. In 2013 the EU established the Integrated 
Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya), with the idea, that “EUBAM Libya will 
support the Libyan authorities in improving and developing capacities in order to enhance the 
security of Libya’s land, sea and air borders, with a long term goal of developing a broader 
Integrated Border Management” (EU-Commission, 2013a). The mandate of EUBAM Libya is 
limited to the borders of Libya, but the initiative should, from the EU side, be seen in the wider 
regional perspective. The official idea behind EUBAM, working closely together with the EU’s 
Frontex agency, is to motivate Libya toward regional and international cooperation, but it also 
indirectly expresses the European strategic interest in controlling the migration phenomenon. 
 
Morocco – a Role Model Mobility Partnership? 
Morocco was the first Mediterranean country to sign an MP agreement with the EU, acting as 
it says in the MP, in accordance with “the Euro-African Migration and Development Dialogue 
(the Rabat Process), the EU-Africa Dialogue, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the 5+5 
Dialogue and the Global Forum on Migration and Development (...) the ACP-EU Dialogue on 
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Migration” (EU-Council, 2013) and drawing on the GAMM. The MP document is interesting in 
the sense that it has a comprehensive view on the migration process, focusing both on the 
migration from Morocco, on the Moroccan nationals legally residing in the EU and the 
nationals from third countries legally residing in Morocco.  
The transit migration through Moroccan is changing its character in the sense that it 
adds a significant dimension to the overall migration patterns in Morocco. This is summarised 
by Mohamed Berriane et al., stating that a “twofold transformation of the migration patterns 
in Morocco is taking place: on the one hand, there is the discontinuity caused in a traditional 
migratory field following the drastic closing of the EU’s external borders; on the other hand, 
there is the emergence of a new pattern in that same migratory field that makes Morocco a 
destination for migratory flows” (Berriane et al., 2013). The study took place in Fes, but 
according to observations by the author there are good reasons to believe that the same 
phenomenon is a reality in other Moroccan cities.1 New dynamics of transit migration related 
to Africans from south of the Sahara point at fragmentations of the migration process leading 
to long stays in transit countries like, in casu, Morocco (Collier, 2007). 
In an EU context it is important that this changing reality is taken into consideration. 
Cities like Fes, Casablanca, etc. become transit ‘hubs’ so to speak on the way from the African 
states south of the Sahara, constituting a huge migratory sending system in the Sahel region, 
to a migratory system on the other side of the Mediterranean, the EU states (Hennebry et al., 
2014). Europe has a new challenge there, which is important to consider, because migration in 
the Moroccan context goes from being a bilateral affair to be dealt with in agreements to 
becoming part of a regional migratory system. Probably these dynamic aspects of the 
migratory movements, including the non-Moroccan migrants, contribute to forms of irregular 
migration, which include both illegal and semi-legal migration, without which the economy in 
several southern Spanish businesses (hotels, agriculture) would have problems surviving. The 
complex transit migration patterns, together with the other types of migration from Morocco, 
represent a reality, with both positive and negative dimensions when seen from the European 
side. In a long term perspective Moroccan migration can contribute to solving the problem of 
the lack of a labour force in the ageing European states. But the more chaotic character of the 
migration processes as they have developed over the last decade adds to the security 
reservations on the EU side. 
Summing up, it seems that EU migration policies in the context of Morocco first of all 
have their traditional foci on measures aimed at prohibiting a liberalization of admission 
policies. There is no clear consensus in the EU concerning the migration–development nexus, 
and there is conflict between the northern EU states, who are reluctant to engage in solving 
the problem, and the southern EU states, who insist on putting the issue high on the EU 
agenda (but also represent double standards by living with the semi-illegal migration in 
southern Spain) (Wunderlich, 2010). Spanish–Moroccan relations underline the large potential 
for internal disagreements between EU member states within a highly contentious policy field 
(Van Hüllen, 2011). 
Morocco is the largest recipient of EU ENP assistance at 580.5 million Euros for the 
2011-2013 period, with a focus on economic development, environmental projects and 
projects dealing with the legal system and human rights (EU-Commission, 2013b). It was 
mentioned in the Press Release related to the MP with Morocco, that of around 3.5 million 
Moroccans living abroad, some 84% (or 2.9 million people) live in Europe. The main objective 
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of the agreement, however, is to focus on the possibilities of developing better management 
of migration from Morocco to the involved European states “recognizing that the issue of 
migration is a key element of the exemplary partnership which has linked Morocco and the EU 
for several decades.”1 Apart from this polite statement, the agreement is very preliminary, 
characterised by declarations of intent. Under all circumstances it seems very early to analyse 
an agreement which has not really been tested by the Mediterranean realities. As mentioned 
earlier in this article the MP document is concerned with controlling the migratory processes 
and with security related to migration. Morocco is not listed as a national partner at the 
Frontex homepage, and this might indicate that the EU wants to use the MP as a kind of lever 
for the EU interests – maintained via Frontex and other EU agencies – in controlling migration 
in the Mediterranean. 
 
Tunisia: a Part of the EU-Mediterranean Security Community? 
As mentioned by Assem Dandashly Tunisia has for decades been close to the EU and has been 
considered an important ally and partner (Dandashly, 2014: 8). The relationship goes back to 
1969 where Tunisia (under Habib Bourguiba) signed a trade-based cooperation agreement, 
which since then has been replaced by new agreements, in 2012 by a Privileged Partnership 
and a new ENP Action Plan, 19 Nov., 2012 (Dandashly, 2014). The EU is attractive for Tunisia in 
several ways and for the EU the Tunisian government is a significant partner regarding 
agreements related to migration and security. The signing of an MP 3 March 2014 is the latest 
expression of EU-Tunisian cooperation, so far of course with relatively limited activities, not to 
mention results. 
Tunisian migration and transit migration via Tunisia take place along the so-called 
central Mediterranean route (different from the Western and the Eastern routes) first of all 
involving Italy, Libya, Malta and Tunisia. The uprisings in Libya and Tunisia were interconnected 
in a migration context in the sense that they “led to a great exodus of migrants from Libya to 
bordering countries and later a huge outflow of boat people from Tunisia headed for Italy, 
particularly the small island of Lampedusa (Pace, 2013: 6).” According to Roderick Pace, the 
majority of these were Tunisian citizens probably trying to escape the political upheavals at 
home but there were also Africans from south of the Sahara fleeing the hardships in their 
home countries, mainly Eritreans and Somalis (Pace, 2013). Seen from the European side, the 
question of transit migration will have to be been dealt with as the MP develops over the 
coming years, as it constitutes an important aspect of the EU security building. 
According to Carrera et al the dialogue on the MPs has “been presented as a fait 
accompli to the authorities of Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco” (Carrera et al., 2012: 14). The EU 
has supported the democratic revolution in Tunisia and demonstrated willingness to negotiate 
with the new government dominated by moderate islamists. The EU has at the same time 
been critical towards problematic incidents as the attack on the US embassy and school 
(Dennison, 2013: 126). As demonstrated by Reslow the EU member states do far from agree 
on everything related to migration policies – and this comes to the fore in connection with the 
MPs. Differences according to the number of MPs each individual EU member state is a 
member of, is a significant expression of this, which is made possible due to the fact that 
participation by the EU member states in the MPs is voluntary. If one of the first working 
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documents for the Task Force established in relation to the EU-Tunisia MP agreement is looked 
at, it becomes obvious that it focuses on both elements which might be rather uncontroversial 
(like seminars and workshops and the establishment of an EU-Tunisia web platform on 
migration), but certainly also on issues, which could easily result in controversies between the 
EU member states (like social reintegration of Tunisian migrants, formulation of a strategy for 
migration management, and border management) (EU-Commission, 2014c).  
 
Conclusion 
There is hardly doubt that the “official” EU considers the implementation of MPs as a 
significant step towards a more comprehensive European migration policy. This is 
demonstrated in a large number of EU documents, homepages, speeches, press releases etc. 
However, as demonstrated in this article, there are obstacles internally among the EU member 
states – and the Arab Mediterranean states do not seem to be very positive either. In other 
words there seems to be a discrepancy at the policy level between the “official” EU in Brussels 
and the way the MPs are perceived both among the “senders” and the “receivers”, to use 
migration related rhetoric. 
The more heterogeneous and unstable MENA reality following the Arab uprisings after 
the short-lived Arab Spring euphoria in 2011 is from the European side perceived as in many 
ways problematic and since the international financial crisis still leaves its mark on the 
European national economies, there is no dramatic need for the labour force that Europe 
might need in the long run and not is able to produce itself. This reality adds to the focus on 
controlling migration (if not even preventing) migration towards the EU – and this might not be 
the ideal context for the promotion of MPs among the EU member states. From the side of the 
Arab Mediterranean the obvious European focus on control and restrictive measures makes 
the alleged arguments related to transit migration and commonalities of interests sound 
rather hollow in the southern Mediterranean. 
Nonetheless both Morocco and Tunisia have signed MP agreements. The economic 
incentives and the pressure of living up to a status as role models for Euro-Mediterranean 
policies were maybe too much to resist. Added to this is the fact that both countries have 
some interests in common with the EU. The interests in dealing with a growing long-range 
transit migration are shared among the EU and the states bordering the Mediterranean. 
Furthermore there is a common interest in preventing radicalization and the spread of terror 
groups on both sides of the Mediterranean. In relation to Jordan (and also to the region as a 
whole) the security issue is added the dimension of the Syrian tragedy. The preparatory talks 
between Jordan and the EU concerning an MP can be interpreted as a trade-off, where Jordan 
gets EU financial support, while contributing to maintaining stability in the Levant (and 
accepting a large amount of refugees). Egypt and Libya have – for different reasons – not 
attended negotiations regarding an MP. Egypt has allegedly refused to enter negotiations – 
maybe as a result of continued turmoil. And so far Libya is only mentioned as a country, which 
the EU sometimes in the future might invite to talks about an MP. 
Some problems related to the MPs can furthermore be identified. If restrictions 
concerning legal migration due to the economic crisis in combination with acceptance of 
readmissions and border management are going to form the basis for the agreements, it might 
be somewhat difficult from the side of the Arab Mediterranean states to see the obvious 
incentives for entering the MP. And if the preconditions for the cooperation based on the MPs 
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are tied up on regulation, control and assistance in the European struggle against irregular 
migration, then some more convincing carrots need to be brought forward from the EU. An EU 
strategy, which asks the southern partners to define their priorities first and then takes this as 
point of departure for the MP negotiations, might be a way ahead.  
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